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ARTICILES
A ROCK UNTURNED: JUSTICE SCALIA'S
(UNFINISHED) CRUSADE AGAINST THE
SEMINOLE ROCKDEFERENCE DOCTRINE
KEVIN 0. LESKE*

After the untimely passing ofjfustice Antonin Scalia, many legal scholars wrote about
the long-lastingimpact that he will have on Article III standing, Second Amendment gun
rzghts, and other important areas offederal law. But one important part of his legal
legacy remained unfinished and unnoticed by the academic community.
Starting in 2011, justice Scalia began to express his frustration with a bedrock
administrative law deference doctrine that he had "uncritically accepted" in the past. His
words, which came in a short concurringopinion in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan
Bell Telephone Co., flagged his newfound skepticism over the validity of the
Seminole Rock doctrine. This concurrence began an impassioned crusade that would
lastfor the nextfive years until his death in February 2016.
Established in 1945, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine directsfederal courts to
defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation unless such
interpretation "is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Despite the
doctrinal and practical significance of the rule in our administrative state, the Seminole
Rock doctrine had remained largely unexamined by the Court. But following Justice
Scalia's statements in Talk America, otherjustices began to recognize his concern.
The justices' growing unease with Seminole Rock emergedfrom the shadows in
2015 in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n. Although the case did not directly raise
the doctrine, the majority opinion was written narrowly and was accompanied by three
separate concurringopinions by justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, expressing their views
that Seminole Rock should be overruled. Tus, the Court seemed poised to re-evaluate
the doctrine. However, following justice Scalia's death, the Court's denial of certiorariin
* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. I would like to thank
Dean Leticia Diaz for her support. I dedicate this Article to my wife, Jennifer, for her
unceasing encouragement and support. I am also grateful to the editors and staff of the
Administrative Law Review for their excellent work.
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Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. in 2016 signaled that Justice Scalia's
crusademight be at its end.
This Article explores the evolution ofjustice Scalia's view on the Seminole Rock
doctrine, which led to his unfinished campaign to have the Court re-evaluate the doctrine.
Its analysishighlights the compelling reasons why the Court should not allow his efforts to
have been in vain. This Article concludes that the Court should re-examine the doctrine in
order to reform Seminole Rock to address the persuasive practicaland constitutional
concerns expressed by Justice Scalia and otherjustices.
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INTRODUCTION

Under the Seminole
to an administrative
such interpretation
regulation."' Despite

1.

Rock deference doctrine, courts are required to defer
agency's interpretation of its own regulation unless
"is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
being critical to our administrative state, the doctrine

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
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has "gone largely unexamined" by the Court, as well as the academic
community.2 However, beginning in 2011, Justice Scalia began to question
the validity of the Seminole Rock doctrine. In his concurring opinion in Talk
America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,3 he signaled that although he had
"uncritically accepted" the doctrine in the past, he would reconsider the
doctrine in the future.4 Soon, other justices echoed Justice Scalia's call that
a re-evaluation of the doctrine might be appropriate in a future case,
including an explicit statement to that effect by Chief Justice Roberts
during the Court's 2012-2013 Term.5
In 2015, in a case that did not directly raise the doctrine, the Court's
separate concurring opinions by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, each
set forth their views that Seminole Rock should be re-evaluated. 6 Thus, the
Court seemed poised to re-evaluate the doctrine. However, following
Justice Scalia's death, the Court's denial of certiorari in Bible v. United Student
Aid Funds, Inc.7 in May 2016 suggests that the inertia amassed in the
preceding years has dissipated.
In Bible, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine was the pivotal issue:
whether to defer to the agency's interpretation of its regulation was
outcome-determinative. 8 Yet the Court declined to hear the case-much
2. See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to
Ageng Regulatoy Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 49, 99 (2000) (proposing that the
Seminole Rock deference doctrine has "lurked beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and
judicial criticism"); Kevin 0. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a HardPlace: A New Approach
to Agency Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 229 (2013) [hereinafter Leske, Hard Place]
(asserting the Seminole Rock deference doctrine has "gone largely unexamined" by the Court,
as well as the academic community).
3. 564 U.S. 50, 67-69 (2011) (Scalia,J., concurring).
4. Id. Justice Scalia referred to the Seminole Rock doctrine as "Auer deference" based on
the 1997 case of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). See Talk Am., 564 U.S. 50 at 6769. It is unknown why the court switched from calling it Seminole Rock deference to Auer
deference. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1088-89, n.26 (2008) (observingJustice Scalia's use of the term).
5. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338-39 (2013) (Roberts, CJ.,
concurring) (making the legal community "aware that there is some interest in
reconsidering" the Seminole Rock doctrine in a future case).
6. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210-11 (2015) (Alito,J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1211-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 1213-25 (Thomas,J., concurring in the judgment).
7. 807 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016).
8. See id. at 841 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (stating
"this is one of those situations in which the precise nature of deference (ifany) to an agency's
views may well control the outcome.").
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to the despair of Justice Thomas, who wrote a poignant dissent to the
Court's order.9 And even more ominous, the justices who had previously
aligned with Justices Scalia and Thomas regarding whether the Court
should re-examine Seminole Rock were silent. 10 Could it be that without
Justice Scalia's persistence (as well as vote), the Court is content to leave
Seminole Rock unturned? I1
But, stepping back, why should we be troubled that the Court's resolve
to re-evaluate Seminole Rock seems to have subsided? The short answer is
rooted in the tremendous importance of regulations in our modern
administrative state. Agency regulations have become the prime method by
which the rights and obligations of private parties are determined.1 2 In
other words, regulations affect the public's legal rights more directly than
statutes. 13

And compounding the importance of regulations is the level of deference
that an agency receives when it sets forth its interpretation of its regulation
The Seminole Rock standard amounts to a
during judicial review.
"controlling" deference standard because it basically obliges a court to
accept the agency's interpretation of an ambiguous regulatory provision.14
This is likely why Chief Justice Roberts observed that the Seminole Rock
9. 136 S. Ct. at 1608 (Thomas,J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
10. See infra Part II.G. (noting that neither ChiefJustice Roberts norJustice Alito joined
Justice Thomas's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Bible); 136 S. Ct. at 1608 (Thomas,
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
11. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing "rule of four").
12. See John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretations
ofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614-15 (1996).
13. Id.
14. Like my previous articles on the Seminole Rock doctrine, see, e.g., Leske, Hard Place,
supra note 2, at 230; Kevin 0. Leske, Splits in the Rock- The Conflicting Interpretations of the
Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the US. Courts ofAppeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 789-90
(2014) [hereinafter Leske, Splits in the Rock], I will refer to Seminole Rock deference as
"controlling" deference because it conforms to the Court's view that the agency's
"administrative interpretation . . . becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945); accord Russell L. Weaver, JudicialInterpretationofAdministrative Regulations:
The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 587, 591 (1984) [hereinafter Weaver, The Deference
Rule] (calling certain deference rules, including Seminole Rock's, "controlling" because they are
outcome determinative). Although other scholars have referred to it as "binding deference,"
the effect is the same. See Manning, supra note 12, at 617 (discussing the concept of "binding
deference," which requires "a reviewing court to accept an agency's reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous legal texts, even when a court would construe those materials
differently as a matter of first impression").
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doctrine goes "to the heart of administrative law" and Seminole Rock
questions "arise as a matter of course on a regular basis" during judicial
review.1 5

It is only recently-and likely because ofJustice Scalia's opinions-that
scholars have begun to build on the existing Seminole Rock scholarship.16
This overdue effort to give the doctrine the attention it deserves is wellfounded. For example, the late Professor Robert A. Anthony, a renowned
administrative law scholar, argued that the Seminole Rock standard conflicts
with the APA.'7 Under the plain language of the APA, federal courts must
determine "the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action." 18
Seminole Rock's controlling deference standard, however,
eviscerates the court's role in this respect because courts are required to
defer absent a "plainly erroneous" or "inconsistent" interpretation by the

15. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, CJ.,
concurring).
16. When I began writing on Seminole Rock in 2011, there was scant in-depth scholarship
on the doctrine apart from John F. Manning's seminal article. Manning, supra note 12; see
also Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency
Regulatoy Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 99 (2000) (recognizing that Seminole Rock
"has lurked beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and judicial criticism"). Much of the
scholarship on judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its regulation came from
Professor Russell Weaver starting in the 1980s. See, e.g., Russell L. Weaver, Challenging
Regulatog Interpretations, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 109, 124-25 (1991) (exploring the various deference
standards and observing the different level of review in each case); Russell L. Weaver,
Deference to Regulatoy Interpretations. Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35, 36-38 (1991)
[hereinafter Weaver, Inter-Agency Conflicts] (asserting that "the courts have disagreed as to
how the deference rules should be applied"); Russell L. Weaver, Evaluating Regulatoy
Interpretations:Individual Statements, 80 Ky. L.J. 987, 987-88, n.3 (1991) [hereinafter Weaver,
Individual Statements] (noting that "the Court has applied other standards as well," when
reviewing regulatory interpretations); Russell L. Weaver, Judicial InterpretationofAdministrative
Regulations: An Overiew, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 683-84 (1984) [hereinafter Weaver, An
Overview] (analyzing judicial concerns during review of agency interpretation of regulations);
Russell L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Regulations:A

&

Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 411 (1992) [hereinafter Weaver
Schweitzer, A Post-Chevron Assessment] (concluding that the deference doctrine used by the
courts "were not always consistent with each other").
17. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA:
Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 1, 9-10 (1996).
18. Anthony, supra note 17, at 9-10 (arguing § 706 of the APA requires a court to
determine the meaning of the terms of an agency action thereby "arm[ing] affected persons
with recourse to an independent judicial interpreter of the agency's legislative act, where,
after all, the agency is often an adverse party"); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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agency.19
On a more practical (and sinister) level, the Seminole Rock standard can
also embolden an agency "to promulgate excessively vague legislative rules"
and "leave the more difficult task of specification to the more flexible and
unaccountable process of later 'interpreting' these open-ended
regulations." 2 0 In other words, an agency might not write its regulations as
precisely as it should because it can rely on receiving Seminole Rock deference
during judicial review after later interpreting its vague regulation
informally. 2 1
There are also constitutional concerns with the Seminole Rock standard.
In 1996, Professor John F. Manning wrote how the standard raises
significant separation of powers issues. 22 Deference to an administrative
agency under Seminole Rock, he argues, essentially licenses an agency to
make the law (because agency regulations can have the force of law) and
also to definitively interpret that "law" (because it receives controlling
deference for such interpretation). 23
This capacity to self-interpret,
however, "contradicts a major premise of our constitutional scheme and of
contemporary separation of powers case law-that a fusion of lawmaking
24
and law-exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties."
Given these substantial concerns, it is disquieting that the Seminole Rock
deference regime has not been the subject of close scrutiny by the Courtespecially compared to the attention showered on its "doctrinal cousin,"
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,25 which applies
when a court reviews a statutory provision.2 6 It is unclear whether Justice

See Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. at 414.
Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Placefor a 'Legislative History" ofAgency Rules,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 290 (2000); see also Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The
Court's Deferences-A Foolish Inconsistency, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2000, at 10-11
(suggesting if an agency knows that a court will defer to its regulatory interpretation, it
creates "a powerful incentive for agencies to issue vague regulations, with the thought of
19.
20.

creating the operative regulatory substance later through informal interpretations").
21. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modem Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1309 (2007) (stating "the [Seminole Rock] doctrine may
tempt agencies to issue vague regulations through the relatively burdensome notice-andcomment process").
22. Manning, supra note 12.
23. See id. at 638-39, 654, 696 (discussing the "separation of lawmaking from lawexposition," and arguing that the Seminole Rock standard fails the separation of powers
analysis).
24. Id. at 617.
25. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
26. See id. at 864-66; see also Leske, Hard Place, supra note 2, at 229 (explaining how
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Scalia's campaign to overturn the doctrine will ever be realized based on
the Court's denial of certiorari in Bible-the first "post-Scalia" Seminole Rock
case.27

Accordingly, this Article explores Justice Scalia's unfinished crusade to
have the Court re-evaluate the Seminole Rock deference doctrine in order to
highlight the compelling reasons why the Supreme Court should not allow
his efforts to have been in vain. Part I of this Article begins by briefly
explaining the Seminole Rock doctrine, its doctrinal justification, and the
reasons why the doctrine is so critical in our administrative state. Next,
Part II analyzes Justice Scalia's evolving view of the Seminole Rock doctrine
during his time on the Court. Finally, Part III attempts to explain why
Justice Scalia radically changed his view on the validity of the Seminole Rock
doctrine. A careful analysis suggests that his newfound rejection of the
doctrine was shaped by his view of the theoretical underpinning of the
related Chevron deference doctrine, subsequent decisions by the Court that
muddied the Chevron and Seminole Rock inquiries, as well as his belief that the
Court's deference regimes had augmented agency power beyond their
breaking points. This Article concludes that Justice Scalia's campaign, as
well as the suggested reasons that account for his shift in view, highlight
why the Court should re-examine the doctrine in order to reform the
doctrine to address the persuasive real-world and constitutional concerns
highlighted by Justice Scalia, other justices, and legal scholars.
I. THE SEMINOLEROCKDEFERENCEDOCTRINE
Before analyzing Justice Scalia's evolving view on the Seminole Rock
deference doctrine, it is of course necessary to briefly review the Seminole
Rock doctrine itself. Accordingly, this Part starts by setting forth the
pertinent facts that led to the Court's landmark ruling establishing the
Seminole Rock standard. Next, it briefly explains the Court's basis for the
doctrine, which was not explained by the Court in the Seminole Rock case.
Rather, it came nearly half a century later in a series of cases that
implicated the doctrine.
Finally, this Part concludes by explaining the significant practical and
separation of powers problems raised by the doctrine. This discussion will
set the stage for an analysis of Justice Scalia's crusade to overthrow the
unlike Chevron, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine "has gone largely unexamined"); accord
Weaver, The Deference Rule, supra note 14, at 589 ("Although commentators have lavished
attention on the subject of statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the problem of
how to interpret regulations.").
27. Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,

136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016).
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doctrine in Part II, as well an exploration of the possible reasons that he
changed his view in Part III.
A. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.

&

The Supreme Court's decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.28 in
1945 established the standard for courts to apply when reviewing an
agency's interpretation of its own regulation.2 9 Under the Seminole Rock
standard, a court must defer to an agency's interpretation of its regulation
unless it "is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 30
At issue in Seminole Rock was Maximum Price Regulation No. 188, which
mandated "each seller shall charge no more than the prices which he
charged during the selected base period of March 1 to 31, 1942."s1 This
regulation, passed under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, was
intended to ease inflation during World War II by controlling prices. 32
The disagreement in the case centered on whether Seminole Rock
Sand had run afoul of the regulation by negotiating a contract to sell
crushed stone for more than the price set during the base period.33 The
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, named Chester
Bowles, sued to prevent Seminole Rock & Sand from selling the stone
because there had been an actual delivery in March 1942 for a lower
price.34 Despite acknowledging that it had delivered crushed stone for a
lower price, Seminole Rock & Sand maintained that there must have been
a charge as well as a delivery at such price to fix the ceiling price.35 And
because the contract for the delivery occurred in October 1941, it argued
that the ceiling limit was not surpassed. 36
The lower court found Seminole Rock & Sand not to be in violation of
the Maximum Price Regulation and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal.37
The question presented for the Court was therefore whether Seminole
Rock & Sand had charged a price that was greater than the maximum
established during the regulatory period.3 8 As an initial matter, the Court

28.

325 U.S. 410 (1945).

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 412, 415.
Id.
Id. at 415.

at 411, 414.
at 414.
at 413.
at 411, 413.

Id. at 412, 415.
Id. at 412-13.
Id. at 413.
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explained that the Administrator's interpretation of the regulation would
39
But if the regulation
only be probative if the regulation was ambiguous.
necessarily look
must
"a
court
that
was ambiguous, the Court determined
40
The Court then
to the administrative construction of the regulation."
establishcd the rule that "the ultimate criterion" in determining a
regulation's meaning "is the administrative interpretation, which becomes
of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation." 4
With respect to the regulation in question, the Court found that there
was an ambiguous phrase, "highest price charged during March, 1942."42
The agency's interpretation of this phrase had been set forth in a bulletin
43
that was released at the time that the regulation was issued. Following the
agency's "consistent administrative interpretation" explained in the
Bulletin, the Court ruled that the highest price of an actual delivery during
March 1942 established the price ceiling. 44 Thus, the Court deferred to the
agency's interpretation of the regulation, thereby reversing the judgment of
the court of appeals.45
B. A BriefDoctrinalExplanationof Seminole Rock
When establishing what would become known as the Seminole Rock
doctrine, the Court did not articulate its precise reasoning to defer to an
agency's interpretation "unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation." 46 However, the rationale for the Seminole Rock deference
was set forth in a series of cases over three decades later.
47
In Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the Court
explained that judicial deference to agency interpretations emanated from
As Justice Scalia later
an agency's delegated lawmaking powers. 48

39.
40.
41.

Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 414.
Id.

42. Id. at 415.
43. Id. at 417.
44. Id. at 415, 418. The Court also appeared to be swayed by its finding that the public
was on notice of this consistent interpretation. Id. at 417-18.
45. Id. at 418.
46. Id. at 414.
47. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
48. Id. at 151 ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing
circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we
presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency's delegated lawmaking powers.") (citation omitted). For additional background on

10
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explained, the theory is that "the agency, as the drafter of the rule, will have
some special insight into its intent when enacting it."49
In the same Term, the Court in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.50 added to
its reasoning that an agency's power to interpret regulations was
entrenched in the delegation to an agency by Congress. 5' In other words,
granting Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations accompanies the
congressional delegation to agencies to make regulations. 52 Two years
later, in 1994, in Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala53 the Court also
suggested that Seminole Rock deference is premised on the theory that the
agency has a specialized expertise in administering its "complex and highly
technical regulatory program."54
C. What's so Wrong with the Seminole Rock Standard?
Although the Seminole Rock standard has developed into an enormously
important principle of administrative law-applied by the courts since its
inception in 194555-it has received far less scrutiny than other deference
doctrines such as the Chevron doctrine.5 6 But as both commentators and
members of the Court have observed, there are numerous concerns
presented by applying such a deferential standard to an agency
interpretation.

Martin, see Leske, HardPlace, supra note 2, at 247.
49. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

50.

501 U.S. 680 (1991).

51.
52.

Id. at 696-9 7. For further background on Pauley, see Leske, HardPlace, supra note 2.
Pauley, 501 U.S. at 698.
As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary's authority to promulgate interim
regulations 'not ... more restrictive than' the HEW [Health, Education, and
Welfare] interim regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW's
regulations and the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based on a
reasonable interpretation thereof. From this congressional delegation derives the
Secretary's entitlement to judicial deference.
Id.

53. 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
54. Id. at 512.
55. See Leske, Hard Place, supra note 2, at 248-71 (describing factors applied by the U.S.
Supreme Court). For a detailed analysis of the interpretation of the courts of appeals, see
Leske, Splits in the Rock, supra note 14.
56. See Angstreich, supra note 16, at 99 (stating that the Seminole Rock deference doctrine
has "lurked beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and judicial criticism"); see also Leske,
Hard Place, supra note 2, at 229 (asserting that unlike Chevron, the Seminole Rock deference
doctrine "has gone largely unexamined").
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First, a controlling deference standard can, as a theoretical matter,
promote an agency "to promulgate excessively vague legislative rules" and
"leave the more difficult task of specification to the more flexible and
unaccountable process of later 'interpreting' these open-ended
regulations." 57 In other words, an agency might not write its regulations as
precisely as it should because it can rely on receiving Seminole Rock deference
58
when it later interprets its vague regulation informally. And because such
regulatory interpretations will be fashioned internally and informally, there
will likely be no notice to the public; nor will there be the ability for the
public to challenge the interpretation, absent an adjudication for violating
one of the regulations at issue. 59
Moreover, "the more misty or vacuous the regulations, the broader is the
discretion to interpret, and the less predictable will be the
interpretations." 6 0 As Professor Manning asserted, "the right of selfinterpretation under Seminole Rock removes an important affirmative reason
for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency can say what its
own regulations mean (unless the agency's view is plainly erroneous), the
6
agency bears little, if any, risk from its own opacity or imprecision."
Second, and relatedly, the late Professor Anthony argued that the
Seminole Rock standard conflicts with the APA.62 Under the plain language
of § 706 of the APA, federal courts must determine "the meaning or
63
This standard was created
applicability of the terms of an agency action."

57. See Lars Noah, Divining Regulator Intent: The Placefor a "Legislative Histor" of Agency
Rules, 51 HASTINGS LJ. 255, 290 (2000); see also Anthony & Asimow, supra note 20, at 10-11
(observing that if an agency is confident that it will receive controlling deference for its
interpretation, it creates "a powerful incentive for agencies to issue vague regulations, with
the thought of creating the operative regulatory substance later through informal
interpretations").
58. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague
regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater
latitude to make law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome
rulemaking process."); see also Hickman & Krueger, supra note 21, at 1309 (stating "the
[Seminole Rock] doctrine may tempt agencies to issue vague regulations through the relatively
burdensome notice-and-comment process").
59. See Anthony & Asimow, supra note 20, at 11 ("The affected public will usually be
unable to participate in shaping the informally-issued regulatory interpretations or to
effectively challenge them in court.").
60. See id.
61. See Manning, supra note 12, at 655.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552; see Anthony & Asimow, supra note 20.
63. 5 U.S.C. § 706; Anthony, supra note 17, at 9-10.
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in order to "arm affected persons with recourse to an independent judicial
interpreter of the agency's legislative act." 64 Thus, the courts should have
an active and primary role in determining the propriety of agency action.
But Seminole Rock's controlling deference standard eviscerates the court's
role in this respect because courts are required to defer absent a "plainly
erroneous" or "inconsistent" interpretation by the agency.65 The loss of the
court as a "check" on the propriety of an agency regulation is especially
troublesome because "the agency is often an adverse party" in a case
involving the interpretation of that regulation.6 6
Third, as a practical matter, Professor Russell Weaver long ago noted
that "courts have experienced great difficulty in interpreting regulations
and applying the [Seminole Rock] deference rule to them." 67 He observed
that even in the wake of Seminole Rock, the Supreme Court has turned to
several different deference standards and has "never adequately explained
how they should be applied."68 Later, other legal scholars agreed that the
Court's determination of how much deference was due to an agency
interpreting its own regulation is ambiguous. 69
Fourth, and last (but certainly not least), are the constitutional concerns
raised with respect to the current Seminole Rock standard. More specifically,
as set forth by Professor Manning, the standard raises separation of powers

64. Anthony, supra note 17, at 9-10. Professors Anthony and Asimow also contend that
the Seminole Rock doctrine contradicts the APA's purpose in allowing for an "exception for
interpretative rules in § 553." See Anthony & Asimow, supra note 20, at 11. These rules
should be subject to "plenary judicial review." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553). This became the
subject of Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
65. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
66. Anthony, supra note 17, at 1, 9.
67. See Weaver, The Deference Rule, supra note 14, at 589; Weaver, Inter-Agency Conflicts,
supra note 16, at 38 (stating that "the courts have disagreed as to how the deference rules
should be applied"); Weaver, Individual Statements, supra note 16, at 987-88 n.3 (stating that
"the Court has applied other standards as well," with regard to the deference rule); Weaver,
An Overview, supra note 16, at 683-84 (discussing problems facing courts when interpreting
agency regulations); Weaver & Schweitzer, A Post-Chevron Assessment, supra note 16, at 411
(stating that the deference principles applied by the courts "were not always consistent with
each other").
68. See Weaver, The Deference Rule, supra note 14, at 592.
69. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1184 ("The amount of deference Seminole
Rock requires has always been ambiguous, also contributing to doctrinal confusion for those
lower courts and commentators who follow such matters."); see also Hickman & Krueger,
supra note 21, at 1307 (stating that "the Court has not clearly established the bounds of
Seminole Rock deference").
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issues. 70 A controlling deference standard permits an agency to cure
ambiguities it created in its own regulations thereby giving the agency the
ability to self-interpret. 71
This authority, however, "contradicts a major premise of our
constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation of powers case
law-that a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially dangerous
to our liberties." 72 Our system of checks and balances, Manning asserts,
requires that there be more of a separation between lawmaking and law
interpretation to satisfy the separation of powers doctrine.73 Therefore, the
74
current Seminole Rock standard fails this doctrine.
Because of these concerns, some scholars assert that the Supreme Court
should dispense with Seminole Rock altogether. Instead, they assert that the
75
deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ought to be applied to an agency's

interpretation of its own regulation. 76 Courts applying Skidmore would
measure an agency's interpretation with consideration of "the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control." 77 This standard would provide
for accountability and the judicial check required to pass the
constitutionally mandated separation of powers. 78 Likewise, by providing a
less deferential standard to agencies, it would dis-incentivize an agency's
attempt to draft vague regulations.79
Countering these arguments, some scholars assert that the Seminole Rock
doctrine should be maintained. Any weakening of Seminole Rock, they argue,
would effectively undermine "the division of responsibility for statutory

70. See Manning, supra note 12, at 638-39, 654 (examining Chevron and Seminole Rock and
the "separation of lawmaking from law-exposition," and analyzing the Seminole Rock decision
using a separation of powers analysis).
71. See id. at 655 ("The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock removes an
important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency can say
what its own regulations mean (unless the agency's view is plainly erroneous), the agency
bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or imprecision.").
72. Id. at 617.
73. Id. at 618.
74. See id. at 654-60 (exploring the dubious approach to separation of powers analysis
applied in Seminole Rock).
75. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
76. Id. at 140; see Anthony, supra note 17, at 10 (arguing for a less deferential standard);
Manning, supra note 12, at 618-19.
77. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
78. See Manning, supra note 12, at 618-19.
79. See Anthony, supra note 17, at 11-12.
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interpretation that Chevron formalized." 80 In other words, if a court is to
follow Chevron's instruction to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation
of ambiguous statutory language, it must first ascertain the meaning of the
regulation at issue. 8'
But if a court were to first reject an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation under Skidmore, it would not
apply the agency's understanding of the regulation when determining the
meaning of the statute when performing the Chevron analysis.8 2 This
interpretation would effectively make the court, rather than the agency, in
charge of policy decisions in contravention of one of Chevron's key
underlying rationales.83 Only an endorsement of Seminole Rock would result
in "shoring up" deference under Chevron.84
Finally, other scholars have offered a new approach.85 For example, a
reformed Seminole Rock could have courts apply a formal, clearly articulated,
and relatively simple standard, which incorporates many of the objective
factors previously applied by the Court when it has previously determined
whether to apply the Seminole Rock standard. 86 Such a standard, by relying
upon certain objective factors, which would limit the subjective inquiry,
"fall[s] comfortably between Chevron's controlling deference and Skidmore's
less deferential treatment that the courts apply when reviewing an agency's
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision."8 7
All told, there have been many concerns expressed, as well as many
solutions proposed, with respect to the Seminole Rock deference doctrine.
Irrespective of which is the best approach to take, one point remains clear:
the Court should at long last take a closer look at the Seminole Rock doctrine
to bring clarity to a doctrine that goes "to the heart of administrative law"
and that "arise[s] as a matter of course on a regular basis."88

80.
81.

Angstreich, supra note 16, at 59.
Id. at 58.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 58, 59 (arguing that "Skidmore's potential for undermining Chevron leads to a
justification for Seminole Rock deference"). In making his argument, Angstreich also staunchly
defends Seminole Rock from the criticism that "it gives agencies too great an incentive to
promulgate vague regulations, violates the Administrative Procedure Act, and is
incompatible with the constitutional principle of separation of powers." Id. at 51.
85. See e.g., Leske, Hard Place, supra note 2, at 230; see also Derek A. Woodman, Rethinking
Auer Deference: Agency Regulations and Due Process Notice, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1746
(2014) (suggesting that the Court should apply a due process notice analysis to Seminole Rock
deference questions).
86. Leske, HardPlace, supra note 2, at 235.
8 7. Id.

88.

See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, CJ.,
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II. THE EVOLUTION OFJUSTICE SCALIA'S VIEW

In order to attempt to explain the reasons why Justice Scalia altered his
view on the Seminole Rock doctrine during the years that he was on the Court
from 1986 to 2016, this Part analyzes the principal cases in which he
opined on the Seminole Rock doctrine, as well as the key case following his
death that suggests that the momentum to re-evaluate the doctrine has
waned.
But before exploring these cases, several key observations can be made
with respect to Justice Scalia and the Seminole Rock doctrine. First, there is
no dispute that Justice Scalia's Seminole Rock doctrine jurisprudence changed
radically during the thirty years he was a member of the Court. The
pivotal expressions of his view, however, came only from 2011 to 2015,
which were his 25-29th years on the Court. Second, it is evident that at
the time of his death at least three additional justices shared his view that
the Court should hear a case that raises the Seminole Rock doctrine. This is
supported by the views expressed by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in recent opinions.89 With that said, it is not
certain whether all of these justices would advocate for overruling Seminole
Rock with the exception of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.90 Third,
following his death, the Court's denial of certiorari in Bible, as well as the
decision by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito not to join Justice
Thomas's dissent from the denial of certiorari, suggests that Justice Scalia's
effort might have been in vain.9 ' It remains to be seen whether the Court
will choose to leave Seminole Rock as it is or to re-evaluate the doctrine in the
future.

concurring) (making the legal community "aware that there is some interest in
reconsidering" the Seminole Rock doctrine in a future case); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 1211 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
89. See infra Part II.E. (discussing Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Roberts, CJ., concurring)
and the potential interest in reconsidering the Seminole Rock doctrine); see also infra Part II.F.
(discussing the Court's opinions in Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199).
90. The Court, including Justice Scalia, has approved of the doctrine in recent cases,
but at the same time declined to grant an agency deference. See Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-67 (2012).

91. Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (ThomasJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
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Justice Scalia's Early Views: Silence on Seminole Rock

On September 26, 1986, Justice Scalia began his tenure on the Supreme
Court. In the four decades prior to his ascension to the bench, the Court
applied the Seminole Rock standard on a somewhat consistent basis, but it
had not engaged in a critical analysis of the doctrine.92 This remained true
untilJustice Scalia expressed his reservations with the doctrine in 2011.
In his first decade on the Court, Justice Scalia appeared to be content to
endorse the Court's allegiance to the doctrine, even in the face of concern
over the doctrine by otherjustices. For example, in the 1987 case of Mullins
Coal Co. of Virginia v. United States Department of Labor,93 Justice Thurgood
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in dissent, cautioned that Seminole Rock
deference could be used as "a license for an agency effectively to rewrite a
regulation through interpretation." 94
Justice Scalia sided with the
majority.9 5
In several other cases throughout the remainder of the 1980s and
beginning of the 1990s, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion that
endorsed the Seminole Rock doctrine. 96 For example, he joined the Court in
two cases that altered the original Seminole Rock standard but did not depart
from it: Gardebringv. Jenkins97 and Thomas Jefferson University.98 In these two
cases, the Court found that the Seminole Rock deference analysis required
consideration of the original intent of the agency when it promulgated the
regulation at issue. 99 He also joined a dissenting opinion in Shalala v.
Guernsej Memorial Hospital,oo which involved an agency interpretation of a
regulation, but nonetheless approved of the use of the doctrine. 0 1

92. For a detailed review of the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the
Seminole Rock doctrine, see Leske, Hard Place, supra note 2, at 248-7 1.
93. 484 U.S. 135 (1987).
94. Id. at 170 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). See generally Leske, Hard Place, supra note 2, at 248-71 (reviewing
development of the doctrine).
95. Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 137.
96. See, e.g., Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 436, n.2 (1994). Justice
Scalia joined the majority opinion, which adhered to Seminole Rock's "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation" standard. Id.; see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,
45 (1993) (joining the majority); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 359 (1989) (joining a unanimous opinion).
97. 485 U.S. 415 (1988).
98. ThomasJefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
99. See Gardebring,485 U.S. at 430; ThomasJefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512.
100. 514 U.S. 87 (1995).
101.

Id. at 102 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
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First, in the 1988 Gardebring case, the Court reviewed whether the
Minnesota Department of Human Services (under Commissioner Sandra
Gardebring) had violated a federal regulation issued by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).102 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the regulation required that the
agency give written notice to the respondent, Kathryn Jenkins, before
suspending her benefits.103 The Supreme Court disagreed by relying on the
Seminole Rock doctrine. 104 When assessing whether to defer to the federal
agency's interpretation, the Court acknowledged that "the Secretary had
not taken a position on this question until this litigation," but the Court
nonetheless deferred:
When it is the Secretary's regulation that we are construing, and when there is no
claim in this Court that the regulation violates any constitutional or statutory
mandate, we are properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the
Secretary's unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain
language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the
05
regulation's promulgation.1

This marked a deviation from the Court's original formulation of the
Seminole Rock standard. Instead of articulating the standard as "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations," the Court stated that a
court must defer unless "the regulation's plain language" dictates otherwise,
or a different interpretation is compelled by "other indications" of an
agency's intent at the time it promulgated the regulation.1 0 6 Seven justices
endorsed this formulation (including Justice Scalia, who joined the
majority), and two justices were in partial dissent. 0 7
Second, in 1994, in Thomas Jefferson University, the Court repeated this
different articulation of the Seminole Rock standard, and, once again, Justice
102. Gardebring,485 U.S. at 417-18.
103. Under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program "a family receiving
nonrecurring lump-sum income" was ineligible for benefits for a certain time period after it
received that payment. Id. at 417-18 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1982)).
104. Id. at 430. Ms.Jenkins had not argued that the agency's regulation, as interpreted
by the agency, violated the statute or that it violated her constitutional rights, such as due
process. Id.
105. Id.
106. Compare Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945), with
Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430.
107. Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 416. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or
decision in the case, and Justice Marshall only joined the last paragraph of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. Id. at 432 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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In Thomas Jefferson University, the Court
Scalia was in the majority.os
considered deference to the HHS interpretation of a Medicare regulation
that prohibited reimbursement of certain educational activities shouldered
The HHS Secretary construed the regulation "to bar
by hospitals. 09
reimbursement of educational costs that were borne in prior years not by
0
the requesting hospital, but by the hospital's affiliated medical school.""1
The Court quoted Seminole Rock and stated that HHS's interpretation must
be given "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
It next parroted Gardebring's formulation to
with the regulation.""'
elaborate on the Seminole Rock standard: "In other words, we must defer to
the Secretary's interpretation unless an 'alternative reading is compelled by
the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's
2
A majority of the
intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation.""'
3
Court then deferred to the agency's interpretation."1
Although four Justices, in dissent, expressed their concern with the
4
Seminole Rock doctrine, Justice Scalia was not one of them. 1 Rather, Justice
Thomas, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg, maintained
that allowing an agency the authority to self-interpret its own regulations
was at odds with an agency's responsibility to resolve statutory

ambiguities.'

'1

In effect, Justice Thomas explained, "the Secretary had merely replaced
6
He announced that by
statutory ambiguity with regulatory ambiguity."1
giving "effect to such a hopelessly vague regulation, the Court disserves the
very purpose behind the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative
7
He
agencies, which is to 'resolve ... ambiguity in a statutory text."'
conceded that it was "perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to
issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and
allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather

108.

ThomasJefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).

109. Id.
Id. at 506 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1993)).
Id. at 512 (quoting Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. at 414).
Id. at 512 (quoting Gardebing,485 U.S. at 430).
See id. at 518 (finding that the Secretary's formation of the redistribution principle
coincides with the plain language of the statute and affirming the decision of the court of
appeals).
114. See id. (ThomasJ., dissenting).
110.

111.
112.
113.

115.

Id. at 519.

116.
117.

Id. at 525.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S.

680, 696 (1991)).
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than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process."IIS However, he
cautioned that ceding this power undercuts the APA's notice-and-comment
procedures."i 9 Consequently, he would not have deferred and would have
found that the Secretary's interpretation violated the APA.120 Thus, despite
these differing formulations, the salient point remains that Justice Scalia
endorsed the Seminole Rock doctrine.
Third, in the following year, the Court had another opportunity to
address the Seminole Rock doctrine. In Guernsy Memorial Hospital, Justice
Scalia joined the dissent, but nonetheless remained in the company of
justices supporting the principles embodied by the Seminole Rock doctrine. 12 1
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter and
Thomas, stated that although she took seriously the Court's "obligation to
defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations ....
An agency is bound by the regulations it promulgates and may not attempt
to circumvent the amendment process through substantive changes
recorded in an informal policy manual that are unsupported by the
language of the regulation." 22
In other words, she disputed the majority's analysis as to whether the
regulation was "inconsistent with regulation" under Seminole Rock-not the
merits of the doctrine vel non.
Thus, with the end of the Court's 1993-1994 Term, there were several
members of the Court who expressed concern over the controlling
deference standard afforded by Seminole Rock, but Justice Scalia was not one
of them. Looking back, however, his absence from the dissenting opinions
in cases such as Gardebringand Thomas Jefferson University was unsurprising.' 2 3
In the 1996-1997 Term, he wrote the unanimous opinion in Auer v.
Robbins 24 in which the Court fully endorsed the Seminole Rock doctrine.1 25

118.

Id.

119.

Id. (asserting that "agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected parties
will have adequate notice concerning the agency's understanding of the law").
120. Id. at 529-30 (citing 42 C.F.R. §413.85(a), (c), (g) (1993)).
121. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 102-03 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
122. Id. at 108, 110-11.
123. Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415 (1988); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at
504; see also Mullins Coal Co. of Va. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 484 U.S. 135 (1987). In the
1995-1996 Term, the Court had one more case where Seminole Rock was raised. In that case,
Justice Scalia dissented, but his arguments did not question the Seminole Rock doctrine. See
Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 241 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
124.
125.

519 U.S. 452 (1997).
Id. at 461.
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B. Auer v. Robbins and Gonzales v. Oregon: UncriticalAcceptance
Justice Scalia's first opinion writing for the Court in a case involving the
Seminole Rock doctrine was the Auer case in 1997.126 This case, decided over
a decade after he joined the Court, soon became the Court's "standard"
citation for supporting the proposition that an agency's interpretation of its
regulation is entitled to deference unless it is "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." 27 Justice Scalia's opinion demonstrated
an open willingness, which he would later call an uncritical acceptance, to
defer to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation under Seminole

Rock. 128
In Auer, the Court was presented with the Secretary of Labor's
29
The
interpretation of both statutory language and regulatory language.'
by
employed
petitioners included Sergeant Francis Bernard Auer, an officer
30
He and other officers sued the St.
the St. Louis Police Department.
Louis Board of Police Commissioners, which included Commissioner
David A. Robbins, for overtime pay allegedly due to them under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938.1s1
The Board claimed that the officers were exempted from overtime pay
eligibility under the FLSA because the officers were "'bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional' employees," which are not eligible under
the FLSA.132 The Board pointed to a regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor, which established a salary-basis test to determine
whether the officers would qualify.1 33 The regulation stated:
An employee will be considered to be paid "on a salary basis" . . . if under his
employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less
frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his compensation,
which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or
quantity of the work performed.1

34

126. Id. at 454.
127. It also resulted in "Seminole Rock deference" also being called "Auer deference" in
the future. It is unknown why the courts and legal community switched from calling it
Seminole Rock deference to Auer deference. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1088-89, n.26
(observing and seeking to explain Justice Scalia's use of the term in his dissent in Gonzales v.

Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 277 (2006) (ScaliaJ., dissenting)).
128.
129.
130.

See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (establishing that deference is "easily met").
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455.

131.

Id.

132.

Id. at 454-55 (quoting Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 1067).

133. Id. at 455 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(f), 541.2(e), 541.3(e) (1996)).
134. Id. (alterations in original) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)).
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In determining whether the officers were salaried employees, the Court
honed in on whether "an employee's pay is 'subject to' disciplinary or other
deductions whenever there exists a theoreticalpossibility of such deductions,
or rather only when there is something more to suggest that the employee is
actually vulnerable to having his pay reduced."1 35
To assist the Court, the Court requested that the U.S. Solicitor General
file an amicus brief offering the Secretary of Labor's view on the salarybasis test.' 36 In the United States' amicus brief, the Secretary interpreted
the salary-basis test to deny exempt status to employees who are "covered
by a policy that permits disciplinary or other deductions in pay 'as a
practical matter."' 137 In other words, if there was either an actual practice
of making such deductions or an employment policy that creates a
"'significant likelihood' of such deductions," then an employee did not have
salaried status.' 3 8
Justice Scalia directly quoted the Seminole Rock standard: "because the
salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own regulations, his
interpretation

of

it

is .

.

. controlling

unless

'plainly

erroneous

or

39

On behalf of a unanimous Court, he
inconsistent with the regulation.""
found the burden "easily met." 4 0 Justice Scalia's opinion in Auer is
representative of many Seminole Rock cases where the Court engages in "a
4
rather mechanical application of the Seminole Rock standard."'
Almost a decade later, in 2006, Justice Scalia again squarely addressed
the Seminole Rock standard in Gonzales v. Oregon.142 But yet again he was
supportive of the doctrine. In fact, he criticized the majority for failing to
defer to the agency under Seminole Rock and, moreover, chastised the Court
for creating an exception for granting deference under Seminole Rock, which
43
he found to have no support in Auer.1
The key question in Gonzales was whether the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) permitted the United States Attorney General to "prohibit doctors
from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicides,
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 459 (emphases added).
Id. at 453, 461.
Id. at 461.

138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Robertson v. Mcthow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
140. Id.
141. See Lcskc, Hard Place, supra note 2, at 259.
142. 546 U.S. 243, 284 (2006). In the time between the Auer and Gonzales decisions, the
Court cited to Auer twelve times. The other cases, as a general matter, remained faithful to
the Auer formulation and analysis. See Leske, Hard Place, supra note 2, at 260 n.22 1.
143.

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure." 44 The Attorney
General had established an interpretive rule that detailed how to
implement and enforce the CSA with respect to the State of Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA).45
The United States argued that its rule was an explanation of its
regulations and thus should be accorded controlling deference under the
Seminole Rock standard.' 4 6 This interpretive rule, however, essentially
parroted much of the statute with respect to several of the act's key terms. 4 7
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court acknowledged that "an
administrative rule may receive substantial deference if it interprets the
issuing agency's own ambiguous regulation," but it declined to defer under
these circumstances.148
The Court reasoned that the language set forth in the interpretive rule
"comes from Congress, not the Attorney General" and that therefore
deference was not warranted. 4 9 The Court further explained that "an
agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when,
instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has
elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language." 5 0 This holding
created an exception to granting Seminole Rock deference and has been aptlycalled the "anti-parroting" canon.' 5
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas,
dissented.1 5 2 Citing the Seminole Rock standard, Justice Scalia asserted that
the Attorney General's interpretation was "clearly valid, given the
substantial deference [the Court] must accord it."'15

He also questioned

the majority's creation of the exception for interpretations that merely

144. See id. at 248-49 (citing Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)).
145. Id. at 249 (citing ORE. REV. STA'r. §§ 127.800-127.990 (2003)).
146. Id. at 256 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2005)).
147. Id. at 254; see 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2006) (explaining how the Attorney General
may deny, suspend, or revoke a physician's registration if it is "inconsistent with the public
interest").
148. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63
(1997)).
149. Id. at 257.
150. Id. (explaining that "the existence of a parroting regulation does not change the
fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the
statute").
151.

See, e.g., Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERT'Y

290 (2011).
152.
153.

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
Id. at 275.
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"'restate the terms of the statute itself" as finding no support in Auer.1 54 He
quipped that the "Court cites no authority for it, because there is none"
and "it is doubtful that any such exception . . . exists." 15 5
Taken together, Auer and Gonzales represent vital cases in Justice Scalia's
Seminole Rock jurisprudence. In both cases, he endorsed a broad application
of Seminole Rock without analyzing or questioning the underlying validity of
the doctrine. Looking back, Justice Scalia was likely referring to these cases
when he wrote later in Talk America that he had "in the past uncritically
accepted" the doctrine.' 56
C. Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.:
Canyou hear me now?
Approximately fifteen years after Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous
Court in Auer fully supporting the Seminole Rock doctrine came an abrupt
change in course in his view concerning the validity of the doctrine.1 57
Although he joined Justice Thomas's opinion for a unanimous Court in
Talk America in 2011, he also penned a brief concurrence where he began
what would be an unfinished crusade to overrule the Seminole Rock
doctrine.1 5 8

The key question in Talk America was whether local telephone service
providers "must make certain transmission facilities available to
competitors at cost-based rates." 5 9 Because "no statute or regulation
squarely addresse [d]" whether the providers were required to do so under
the applicable statute and regulations, the Court explained that "in the
154. Id. at 275, 277.
155. Id. at 277.
156. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67-68 (2011) (Scalia,
concurring).

J.,

157. From 2006 (when Gonzales was decided) until mid-2011, the Court invoked the
Seminole Rock doctrine eight times. There was nothing exceptional about the cases with
respect to justice Scalia's Seminole Rock jurisprudence. See Williamson v. Mazda Motor of
Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871,
880 (2011); Cocur Ala., Inc. v. Sc. Ala. Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 274-75 (2009);
Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 295-96 (2009); FedEx
Corp. v. Holowccki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 328
(2008); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007); Nat'l Ass'n of
Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672 (2007). In all these cases, except Long
Island Care, the Court cited Auer for the Seminole Rock deference standard.
158. See Talk Am., 564 U.S. at 52; id. at 67-68 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (explaining that he
would hold the same as the majority without the Seminole Rock doctrine because "the FCC's
interpretation is the fairest reading of the orders in question").
159. Id. at 53 (majority opinion).
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'

absence of any unambiguous statute or regulation," it would "turn to the
The FCC construed its
FCC's interpretation of its regulations."1 60
regulations to mandate use of the facilities if they were to be used "to link
the incumbent provider's telephone network with the competitor's network
for the mutual exchange of traffic."' 6
Despite not being a party to the litigation and having submitted its
interpretation in a brief as amicus curiae, the Court nonetheless deferred to
the FCC.62 The Court supported its decision to grant Seminole Rock
deference by citing Auer and reasoned that the FCC's interpretation was
worthy of deference "even in a legal brief, unless the interpretation [was]
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]' or there [was] any
other 'reason to suspect that the interpretation [did] not reflect the agency's
63
fair and considered judgment on the matter in question."
The Court then scrutinized the FCC interpretation and concluded that it
was not "'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation [s],"' and was
"more than reasonable."' 64 It also observed that "there [was] no danger
that deferring to the Commission would effectively 'permit the agency,
under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation,"' and that the interpretation did not constitute "a post-hoc
rationalization."165
Although Justice Scalia's endorsement of Justice Thomas's opinion
would not have raised any eyebrows, his concurring opinion certainly did.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia focused on the Seminole Rock doctrine and,
more specifically, his newborn uncertainty with its place in our
administrative state: "For while I have in the past uncritically accepted that
rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity."' 6 6 He recognized
the problems previously identified with the doctrine, such as the separation
of powers concerns, that it could encourage agencies to promulgate vague
regulations, and that it "frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of
rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government."' 6 7 Justice Scalia
concluded his opinion by bluntly stating that "we have not been asked to

160. Id. at
161. Id. at
162. Id. at
163. Id. at
131 S. Ct. 871,

57, 59.
53.
67.
59 (second alteration in original) (quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy,
881 (2011) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997))).
Id. at 61-62 (alteration in original) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
Id. at 63-64 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
Id. at 67-68 (Scalia, j., concurring) (referring to the Seminole Rock doctrine as "Auer

164.
165.
166.
deference.").
167. Id. at 68-69.
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reconsider Auer in the present case. [But when] we are, I will be receptive
to doing so." 16 8
It goes without saying that Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Talk
America sent ripples through administrative law circles and prompted a
renewed interest by scholars in examining the doctrine. More broadly and
more importantly, his opinion is remarkable in the dramatic and wholescale shift injustice Scalia's view of a bedrock administrative doctrine that,
in his own words, he had "uncritically accepted" in the past.1 69 At the time,
it remained to be seen whether his remarks represented his isolated view
that would be cabined to the facts of Talk America or whether it would be a
harbinger of a more concentrated assault on the Seminole Rock doctrine.
D. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.:
A Step ForwardandA Step Back?
Following Justice Scalia's brief concurrence in Talk America, the legal
community paid special attention to subsequent cases that raised Seminole
Rock issues. And such a case came the very next year in 2012. With respect
to Justice Scalia's skepticism about the validity of the Seminole Rock doctrine,
however, the case sent a mixed-message. On one hand, Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp.170 is the rare case where the Court declined to grant
Seminole Rock deference to an agency interpretation.1 7 On the other hand
(and surprisingly), Justice Scalia was part of the majority, which endorsed
the doctrine, despite finding that Seminole Rock deference was not
appropriate under the facts presented.172
In SmithKline Beecham, the Court determined whether a Department of
Labor (DOL) regulation defining "outside salesman" included
pharmaceutical sales representatives. 7 3
After examining the DOL
regulations and DOL's interpretation, the Court evaluated whether it
should defer to DOL's interpretation under Seminole Rock.1 74 Although it
acknowledged that deference was usually due, the Court clarified that "this
general rule does not apply in all cases." 175 The Court then focused on
previous circumstances where it refused to defer under Seminole Rock,
including "when there is reason to suspect that the agency's interpretation
168.

169.
170.

Id. at 69.
Id. at 68.

132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).

171.

See id. at 2166-67.

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. at 2161.
Id. at 2165.
Id. at 2166.
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'does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question."'76

As examples of when the "fair and considered judgment" element was
not met, the Court noted "when the agency's interpretation conflicts with a
prior interpretation,"177 and when an agency's interpretation appears to be
"nothing more than a 'convenient litigating position,' . . . or a 'post hoc

rationalizatio[n]' advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency
action against attack."178 Examining these issues, the Court declined to
defer to the DOL's interpretation under Seminole Rock.179 The Court
reasoned that accepting DOL's interpretation would not give fair warning
to the public and would constitute "unfair surprise." 80
In Justice Thomas's majority opinion, he conceded that there were
important advantages" to applying Seminole Rock
"undoubtedly ...
8
then
he reasoned that Seminole Rock deference also creates
1
But
deference.'
a risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that
they can later interpret as they see fit, thereby "frustrat[ing] the notice and
predictability purposes of rulemaking." 82 Thus, SmithKline Beecham is a step
forward for the searching inquiry performed by the Court when deciding
whether to defer in order to protect against the risks previously identified by
Justice Scalia (and Justice Thomas) in Seminole Rock cases. But it is also a
step back with respect to the approval byJustice Scalia of the validity of the
doctrine.
E. Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center:
Enough is Enough
It was not long before the Seminole Rock doctrine appeared in another
Supreme Court case. A year after SmithKline Beecham, the Court released its
opinion in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.' 83 Beyond Justice
Scalia's vociferous attack on the doctrine, the separate opinions of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito made it clear that there was enough

176.
177.
178.
462).
179.
180.

(2007)).
181.

Id. at 2166 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
Id. (citing ThomasJefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)).
See id. at 2166 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at
Id. at 2168.
Id. at 2167 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170

Id. at 2168.

182. Id. (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).

183.

133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
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momentum amassed that the Court would re-evaluate the doctrine in a
suitable case.
At issue in Decker was whether the federal "Clean Water Act [CWA] and
its implementing regulations required permits before channeled stormwater
runoff from logging roads can be discharged into the navigable waters of
the United States."l 84 The CWA and the implementing regulations issued
by the EPA mandated that a permit for such runoff is necessary if the
discharge is "deemed to be 'associated with industrial activity."1 85 An EPA
regulation further defined "the term 'associated with industrial activity' to
cover only discharges 'from any conveyance that is used for collecting and
conveying stormwater and that is directly related to manufacturing,
86
processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant."
Like in other Seminole Rock cases, the EPA filed an amicus brief for the
case stating that "the EPA interprets its regulation to exclude the type of
stormwater

discharges from logging roads

at issue."

87

The Court

concluded, applying the Seminole Rock doctrine, that deference to the EPA's
interpretation was appropriate because the EPA's determination was a
"reasonable interpretation of its own regulation."1 8 8 The majority decision,
therefore, was a fairly straightforward application of the Seminole Rock
doctrine.
However, it was the separate opinion ofJustice Scalia and others that are
noteworthy with respect to Seminole Rock. First, in a separate opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Scalia agreed with the
majority that the case was not moot and that the District Court had
jurisdiction, but he appeared to have reached his breaking point when
stating, "enough is enough" with respect to "giving agencies the authority
to say what their rules mean under the harmless-sounding banner of"
Seminole Rock deference. 8 9
Justice Scalia was prompted to write because unlike in Talk America,
where the "agency's interpretation of the rule was also the fairest one, and
no party had asked [the Court] to reconsider" the doctrine, the application
of the Seminole Rock doctrine in Decker, "[made] the difference."19 0

184.

Id. at 1330.

185.

Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (2006)).

186. Id. at 1330-31 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006)).
187. Id. at 1331 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 24-27, Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) (No. 11-338)).
188. Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
189. Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Talk Am.,
Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia,J., concurring)).
190. Id.
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Moreover, he maintained that the "circumstances of these cases illustrate
[Seminole Rock's] flaws in a particularly vivid way." 19 1
He pointed out that the Court had not "put forward a persuasive
justification" for Seminole Rock deference and proffered many of the
criticisms of the doctrine argued in scholarship and by justices in past
cases.1 92 Justice Scalia ended his attack on the Seminole Rock doctrine by
concluding that "however great may be the efficiency gains derived from
Auer deference, beneficial effect cannot justify a rule that not only has no
principled basis but contravenes one of the great rules of separation of
powers,"-namely that "who writes a law must not adjudge its
violation." 93
Second, the other aspect of Decker that was significant with respect to
Justice Scalia's campaign was the concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, which clarified their interest in reevaluating the Seminole Rock doctrine.1 94 The Chief Justice acknowledged
that Justice Scalia's opinion "raise [d] serious questions about the
principle[s] set forth" in Seminole Rock and Auer.1 95 Chief Justice Roberts
concluded his opinion by letting it be known that that he "would await a
case in which the issue is properly raised and argued."' 9 6
F. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n: The Elephant in the Room
Given the Court's various opinions in Decker, it was no surprise that the
Seminole Rock doctrine took center stage in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n'97 in
its 2014-2015 term. Although the case did not directly raise the Seminole
Rock doctrine, the three separate concurring opinions penned by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-as well as their questions at the oral
arguments-demonstrated that the Seminole Rock doctrine was the
198
proverbial elephant in the room.

191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)); see generally Anthony, supra note 17, at 11-12; Manning, supra note

12).
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1338 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
Id. (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), and Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)).
196. Id. Although the ChiefJustice remarked that "it may be appropriate to reconsider
that principle in an appropriate case," he conceded that Decker was not appropriate because
193.
194.
195.

the parties had not set forth arguments on the issue. Id. at 1338-39.
197. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
198. Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
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199
The
Justice Sotomayor wrote the decision on behalf of the Court.
central question presented in the case was whether the Paralyzed Veterans
200
Under the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine was consistent with the APA.
doctrine, which was created by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in 1997, "once an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it
can only change that interpretation as it would formally modify the
regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment
rulemaking." 20 1 Thus, Seminole Rock was potentially implicated by the
Court's assessment of the validity of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine as it

applied to informal agency interpretations of its own regulations.
2
The
The case involved DOL regulations implementing the FLSA.20
FLSA, as a general matter, mandates that covered employers pay overtime
203
An
wages to employees who work more than forty hours per week.
a
in
exemption in the FLSA, however, states "'any employee employed
or in the
bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity ...
capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from
time to time by regulations of the Secretary ...),' is exempt from the
'minimum wage and maximum hour requirements' otherwise required by
the Act."

20 4

The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) alleged that DOL had shifted
205
The MBA maintained
its interpretation of the scope of the exemption.
should be subject to
officers,
loan
that certain employees, such as mortgage
206
It pointed to
the FLSA exemption; thus, not entitled to over-time pay.
various DOL opinion letters, as well as an administrative interpretation
207
The latest of these
bulletin, that showed DOL's shifting interpretation.

1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
199. See id. at 1203 (majority opinion).
200. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551-706 (2012).
201. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997). The court revisited, and re-affirmed, this holding later in Alaska Profl Hunters Ass'n v.
FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but the doctrine is most often cited as the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.
202. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204-05; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012).
203. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204-05; see 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262;
see also Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195-96 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §
207(a)(1).
204. See Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
213(a)(1)).
205. Id. at 196-201.
206. Id. at 198.
207. Id. at 201.
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interpretations was one that the MBA challenged as violating the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine.208
The unanimous Court held that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
"improperly impose [d] on agencies an obligation beyond the 'maximum
procedural requirements' specified in the APA."209 The Court reasoned
that the APA plain language stated that unless "'notice or hearing is
required by statute,' the APA's notice-and-comment requirement 'does not
apply .. . to interpretative rules."' 210 Simply stated, "because an agency is
not required to adhere to the notice-and-comment" requirements when
developing an initial interpretive rule, it is not required to do so if it later
decides to alter or repeal such interpretive rule. 211 Thus, as a result of the
APA's categorical exemption of interpretive rules from the notice-andcomment provisions, the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine could not stand. 212
While the Court's decision was significant and uncontentious in vacating
the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the justices' separate concurrences
concerning the Seminole Rock doctrine were more controversial. Justice
Scalia's opinion was his most comprehensive explanation on why Seminole
Rock should be overruled.
Justice Scalia first agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine was irreconcilable with the APA.213 He then disputed the
"Court's portrayal of the result" as being justifiable in light of Congress's
desire to allow agencies leeway to issue interpretive rules. 214 He asserted
that the Court's current deference doctrines, such as the Seminole Rock
doctrine, had upended the balance that Congress intended when it enacted
the APA.215
In his view, the APA was enacted as a "check" to agency "zeal" because
of the tremendous growth of our administrative state. 2 16 Although agencies
needed the ability to thrive and react to a changing world, the APA's
208. Id.
209. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) (citing Vt. Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)).
210. Id. at 1206 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) ("Notice of
proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register."); id. § 553(c) ("The agency
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making.").
211. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206.
212. See id.
213. Id. at 1211 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
214. Id.
215. Id. In his view, the Court's development of an "elaborate law of deference to
agencies' interpretation of statutes and regulations" now gives agencies the ability to
"authoritatively resolve ambiguities" in both statues and regulations. Id.
216. Id. (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950)).
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notice-and-comment provisions and the mandate that courts should
"'interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action"' were designed
to guard against abuse.2 17
However, the Court's deference doctrines, including the Seminole Rock
doctrine, have rendered the courts' role illusory. 218 He asserted that when
courts defer to agency interpretations, agencies can effectively bind the
public and such interpretive rules have the force of law. 219 With respect to
the Seminole Rock deference doctrine, Justice Scalia contended that it is
especially problematic because if an agency promulgates broad and vague
substantive regulations, it can later interpret such regulations according to
its needs and then receive controlling deference for its interpretations. 220
This ability, Justice Scalia asserted, conflicted with Congress's intent when
it enacted the APA.221 He also repeated the separation of powers concerns
that he had previously voiced in other cases. 222
Justice Scalia's solution that would "restore the balance originally struck
by the APA with respect to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations" would be for the Court to overrule Seminole Rock.223 These
would be Justice Scalia's final words with respect to the Seminole Rock

217. Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)). Justice
Alito similarly recognized in his concurrence that the D.C. Circuit could have created the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine to check the "aggrandizement of the power of administrative
agencies." Id. at 1210-11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
This power, he asserted, amassed because Congress's delegation of broad lawmaking
authority to agencies coupled with the Seminole Rock deference doctrine led to agencies'
exploitation of the border between legislative and interpretive rules. Id. at 1210. To address
this issue, he cited to the separate opinions of both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas to
highlight "substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect." Id. at 121011; id. at 1211-13 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
218. Id. at 1211 (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia also pointed out
the Court has been relying on Seminole Rock even though it was decided before the APA was
enacted. Id.
219. See id. at 1212 ("Interpretive rules that command deference do have the force of
law.").

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 1213.
223. Id. Justice Thomas, too, wrote at length about his disdain for the Seminole Rock
doctrine. Id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For an in-depth
look at Justice Thomas's views, see Kevin 0. Leske, Chipping Away at the Rock: Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Association and the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine, 49 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2017).
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deference doctrine.
G. Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.:
Justice Thomas Carriesthe Torch
Following Justice Scalia's death in February of 2016, the Court was
presented with a case that squarely implicated the Seminole Rock deference
doctrine. In Bible, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
deferred to the Department of Education's (DOE's) interpretation of one of
its own regulations.224 The defendant, United Student Aid Funds, Inc.,
petitioned to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
On May 16, 2016, the Court denied the petition; Justice Thomas
dissented from the denial of certiorari. 225 He agreed with Judge Manion,
who had written a partial dissent in the case below, that the DOE's
interpretation is "not only at odds with the regulatory scheme but also
defies ordinary English." 226
Quoting Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
asserted that "by enabling an agency to enact 'vague rules' and then to
invoke Seminole Rock to 'do what it pleases' in later litigation, the agencywith the judicial branch as its co-conspirator--frustrates the notice and
predictability purposes
of rulemaking,
and promotes arbitrary
government." 2 27
Justice Thomas lamented that the "case is emblematic of the failings of
Seminole Rock deference." 228 In his view, this was a suitable case for reevaluating Seminole Rock. 229 He criticized the Court for "sitting idly by"
while permitting "he who writes a law" to also "adjudge its violation." 230
III. A ROCK UNTURNED

A. Preliminary Thoughts
With Justice Scalia's views now explained, the next question is: what
accounts for the paradigm shift in his view concerning the Seminole Rock
224. Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2015). The
Department of Education's (DOE's) interpretation had been set forth in an amicus brief that
the DOE filed at the invitation of the Seventh Circuit. Id.
225. Id., cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas,J., dissenting from the denial
ofcertiorari).

226.

Id.

227. Id. (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (Scalia,
concurring)).

228.
229.

Id.
See id.

230.

Id. (quoting Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013)).
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deference doctrine? This Part attempts to explain the possible reasons that
prompted his radical change on the validity of the Seminole Rock doctrine.
While we may never know precisely, several key observations can be made.
And these observations underscore why the Court should undertake a
meaningful evaluation of the doctrine in a future case.
First, Justice Scalia's view on deference to an administrative
interpretation of its regulation is inextricably tied to his view on deference
23
to an agency's interpretation of a statutory provision under Chevron. 1 The
Seminole Rock doctrine and Chevron doctrine are, after all, "doctrinal cousins"
and Justice Scalia regards Seminole Rock deference as "Chevron deference
applied to regulations rather than statutes." 232 And in particular, his view
that the theoretical foundation of Chevron is premised on providing a
"background rule of law against which Congress can legislate" helped to
pave the way for his subsequent rejection of Seminole Rock later in his tenure
233
on the Court.

Second, it is likely that the Court's decision in United States v. Mead
Corp.234 and Seminole Rock doctrine cases, such as Gonzales and SmithKline
Beecham, contributed to his skepticism towards the efficacy of the Court's
deference doctrines.235 These cases, in his view, muddied the water with
respect to the functionality of Chevron deference and Seminole Rock deference,
respectively, to provide "an across-the-board presumption that, in the case
of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant." 236
Third, these factors coupled with the growth of our administrative state,
which in his view led to a significant (and dangerous) expansion of agency
power, crystallized his belief that the Seminole Rock doctrine violated
separation of powers principles and therefore should be abandoned.

231.

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43

(1984).
232. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837).
233. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, Administrative Law Lecture at Duke University
School of Law,January 1989, in 1989 DUKE LJ. 511, 517 (1989) [hereinafter ScaliaJudicial
Deference].
234.
235.
Beecham
236.

533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See generally Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Christopher v. SmithKline
Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
ScaliaJudicial Deference, supra note 233 at 516.
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B. Illusoy Intent, Blanket Presumptions, and the Expansion ofAgency Power in Our
Modem Administrative State
Just three years after he joined the Court, Justice Scalia had an
opportunity to share his view on the Chevron doctrine where, five Terms
before, the Court established the landmark two-step test to analyze an
agency's interpretation of its own statute. 237 Analyzing his views on Chevron
deference is imperative because Justice Scalia viewed Seminole Rock
deference as being "Chevron deference applied to regulations rather than
statutes."2 38
During an Administrative Law Lecture in 1989 sponsored by the Duke
LawJournal, he explored both the theoretical basis of Chevron and predicted
the practical implications of the Court's decision. 239 Most notable, Justice
Scalia rejected the notion that separation of powers principles compelled
judicial deference under Chevron. 240 An often repeated justification for
Chevron is that, in its simplest form, where Congress leaves an ambiguity or
"gap" in legislation, which cannot be ascertained by its plain language, the
resolution of such issues involves policy judgments that must be answered
by the Executive Branch. 24 1 Rather, he believed that "traditional tools of

237. See Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 233, at 511; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-43. Under Chevron step-one, a court looks to the statutory language to determine
whether Congress has directly spoken on the question at issue. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243. If the statute's language is unambiguous, then the court applies the plain meaning of the
statute (and the agency's interpretation of the statutory provision is irrelevant). See id. If the
statute is silent or ambiguous, however, the court proceeds to Chevron step-two, where it
determines whether the agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of
the statute." Id. at 843. If the interpretation is reasonable, then the interpretation must be
accepted. See id. at 843-44.
238.
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837). In his view,
courts will accept an agency's interpretation even if it is not the fairest reading of the
regulation, as long as it is a plausible reading. Id. at 1339-40.
239. See Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 236, at 516. In what would become
typical humor and bluntness, Justice Scalia warned the students to "lean back, clutch the
sides of your chairs, and steel yourselves for a pretty dull lecture" and to expect "a quiz
afterwards." Id. at 511.
240. See ScaliaJudicial Deference, supra note 236, at 515-16.
241. See id. at 514-15. Scalia cited to several academic articles. See, e.g., Douglas W.
Kmiec, JudicialDeference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN.
LJ. 269, 277-78, 283-85 (1988); Kenneth Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3

YALEJ. ON REG. 283, 308, 312 (1986) (noting that Chevron shifts policymaking responsibility
from courts to "democratically accountable officials" in agencies). He also rejected the
notion that "the 'expertise' of the agencies in question, their intense familiarity with the
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statutory construction" includes a full range of interpretive tools, including
text, legislative history, as well as the consideration of policy implications. 242
These considerations are applied at Chevron step-one when determining
whether ambiguity exists. 243 If ambiguity does exist, courts will defer to an
agency under step-two if its interpretation is reasonable. 244
He offered a hypothetical that "painlessly" rejects any separation of
powers justification for Chevron: if Congress specified in a statute that an
agency view should be given no deference during judicial review, it seems
beyond serious dispute that courts would follow that direction and engage
in an interpretive analysis de novo. 245 This, he posited, proves that courts
are not constitutionally prohibited from evaluating policy considerations that
deference is necessary. 246 If it were the case, such a command by Congress
could not stand because it would be trumped by the Constitution, as
embodied by separation of powers principles. 247
248
Rather, the theoretical underpinning, in his view, is more modest.

Deference under Chevron is nonetheless a function of Congress's intent but is
premised on a different proposition. When Congress leaves an ambiguity,
it either intended a result but was imprecise, or Congress had no certain
249
intent in mind and thereby meant the agency to resolve the ambiguity.

The Court's approach to the interpretive question during judicial review,
however, is different depending within which category the ambiguity
falls. 250 If Congress was not clear but intended a given result then the case
presents a legal question that should be resolved by the courts. 25 i But
where Congress intended to have the agency resolve the issue, the court's
role is to determine whether the agency acted within the scope of its
discretion. 252 This threshold inquiry to evaluate congressional intent
resulted in a statute-by-statute analysis that in the past had led to

history and purposes of the legislation at issue, or their practical knowledge of what will best
Scalia, Judicial
effectuate those purposes" provided a theoretical basis for Chevron.
Deference, supra note 236, at 514.
242. See ScaliaJudicial Deference, supra note 236, at 515.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id.
See id. at 516.
See id. at 515-16.
See id. at 516.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

251.

See id.

252.

See id.

36

ADMINISTRATIVE IwREVIEW

[69:1

"uncertainty and litigation."253
The Chevron doctrine, therefore, sought to simplify the judicial role by
imposing an "across-the-board presumption" that where ambiguity is
present courts should assume that Congress intended agencies to have
discretion. 254 In actuality, Justice Scalia was even more cynical because
discerning "genuine" legislative intent was, in his words, "a wild-goose
chase anyway" because "Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2)
meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn't think
about the matter at all."255 Thus, he regarded the entire Chevron doctrine as
being even more illusory than his initial assumption and is justified as
"merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a
background rule of law against which Congress can legislate." 256

Seen in this light, the Chevron doctrine allows for the required flexibility,
as well as the necessary political participation, in the administrative
process. 2 5 7

In other words, if viewed as a background rule of law in

administrative law, Congress has learned that any ambiguity that results
from its statutory creations (irrespective of whether such ambiguity was
intentional or simply an oversight) will not be left to the courts to
interpret. 258 Rather, agencies, which remain accountable to the political
process-and that are cabined by the requirement that their interpretations
are reasonable-will be empowered to resolve such ambiguities.259
Thus, in 1989, Justice Scalia endorsed the Chevron doctrine, albeit with a
different theoretical underpinning than has been articulated throughout the
cases and in the scholarship. And because the Court and scholars have
suggested that controlling deference under Seminole Rock is implicit in
Congress's delegation to agencies under Chevron,260 we can surmise that, if
253.

Id.

254. Id. (stating that "it is beyond the scope of these remarks to defend that
presumption" because he was not on the Court when Chevron was decided but asserting that
"it is a more rational presumption today than it would have been thirty years ago-which
explains the change in the law").
255. Id. at 517.
256.
257.

Id.
See id.

258. See id.
259. See id. At bottom, Justice Scalia agreed with the adoption of the Chevron doctrine,
but not merely because it was going to result in a more manageable decisionmaking process
(for both the courts and litigants), but instead "because it more accurately reflects the reality
of government, and thus more adequately serves its needs." Id. at 521.
260. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
151 (1991) ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing circumstances
calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that
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he gave any serious thought to the Seminole Rock doctrine at the time, he
would have regarded Seminole Rock's foundation as the same: namely, a
"blanket default rule" for both courts and Congress. 26
Turning back to the important question of what changed in Justice
Scalia's mind to prompt him to retract his uncritical acceptance of the
Seminole Rock doctrine over twenty years later; a lecture that he presented in
2009, two years prior to his Talk America concurrence, sheds light on the
evolution of his view. During his speech to mark the 25th anniversary of the
Chevron decision, he reflected on his previous observations and predictions
on the impact of the Chevron doctrine, as well as the Court's more recent
decision in Mead.262 These insights, coupled with frustration over more
recent Seminole Rock cases, as well as his view concerning agency power, help
explain the evolution of his view that Seminole Rock should be overruled.
First, simply stated, Justice Scalia hated Mead.26 3 In the 2006 case, the
Court in Mead ruled a court should only grant an agency Chevron deference
when Congress authorizes the interpretation of a statute, and such
interpretation carries with it the force of law. 264 justice Scalia immediately
recognized, in his dissent, that "its consequences will be enormous, and
almost uniformly bad."

265

In his 2009 remarks, he noted that in 1989 he had predicted, "that in the
long run Chevron will endure and be given its full scope." 266

However,

Scalia conceded this prediction had been wrong due to Mead's back-peddle
with respect to the deference inquiry under Chevron.267 Under Mead, the
Court established that courts must first determine whether "it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority." 266
In Justice Scalia's view, Mead had a significant impact on Seminole Rock
deference in several respects. He expressed concern that Chevron deference
the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's

delegated lawmaking powers."); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,
566, 568 (1980).
261. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks for the
25th Anniversary of Chevron v. NRDC at American University Washington College of Law,
April 2009, in 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 243, 244 (2014). [hereinafter Scalia, 25th Anniversary].
262. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
263. Id. at 241, 261 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 231-32 (majority opinion).
265. Id. at 261 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
266. See ScaliaJudicial Deference, supra note 236, at 521.
267. See Scalia, 25th Anniversary, supra note 261, at 244.
268. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
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coupled with Mead's new analysis would cause an agency to create "barebones" regulations because the exercise of creating a regulation-as skeletal
as it might be-would demonstrate to a court that it had been enacted
under a delegation from Congress.269 And to the extent that the agency
wanted to clarify that interpretation later, it would upon judicial review
receive Chevron deference for the regulation (since it was promulgated under
the notice-and-comment period) and then receive Seminole Rock deference
for its interpretation. 270
Such a system would thwart the very goal that Mead sought to serve
because it would allow the agency to receive deference for the "meat" of
the regulation (found in the subsequent interpretation) without ever having
to engage in "procedural formalities." 2 7 1 Thus, the fact that "agencies
[could] get wise to this gimmick" of a "Mead loophole" may explain a
pragmatic reason why he wished to overturn Seminole Rock deference:
272
without Seminole Rock deference, the loophole would close.

Second, by installing this new predicate step into the Chevron analysis
(called Chevron step-zero 273 in the academic literature), Justice Scalia was
concerned that the Court had turned the inquiry into a "case-by-case,
statute-by-statute mode of analysis .

.

. with all the harmful side effects" that

274

As one commentator suggested, it is
accompany such types of analysis.
possible that the Court's use of "Mead's controversial flexible deference
regime in the previously uncontroversial [Seminole Rock] context" might
275
have prompted his shift.

If we view Justice Scalia's loyalty to deference doctrines, such as Chevron
and Seminole Rock, as being mostly rooted in their utility "to simplify the
judicial process of giving or withholding deference" then perhaps Justice

269. See Scalia, 25th Anniversary, supra note 261, at 245.
270. Id. Justice Scalia had previously articulated this view in Perez where he asserted
that Seminole Rock deference incentivizes agencies to create broad and vague substantive
regulations because an agency can later interpret these regulations through interpretive
rules, which do not require notice and comment, and receive controlling deference for such
interpretations. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212 (2015) (Scalia,
concurring).
271. See Scalia, 25th Anniversary, supra note 261, at 245.

J.,

&

272. Id. at 246.
273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (explaining
the development of the Court's "initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies
at all"); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 836 (2001).
274. Scalia, 25th Anniversary, supra note 261, at 244.
275. Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 YALE L.
POL'Y REV. 175, 194 (2014).
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Scalia grew frustrated by the Court's Seminole Rock cases that eroded the
doctrine's straightforwardness. 276 As Justice Souter observed in Mead,
'Justice Scalia's first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify,"
while "the Court's choice has been to tailor deference to variety."

277

Therefore, to the extent that a bright-line rule became riddled with
exceptions, we can expect that Justice Scalia would have become frustrated
and questioned its vitality in favor of other considerations.
One Seminole Rock example where we see this to be true is Gonzales.278 In
Gonzales, Justice Scalia questioned the basis for the majority's creation of the
exception to Seminole Rock deference for agency interpretations that merely
"restate the terms of the statute itself' (the anti-parroting exception). 279 In
the dissent, he quipped that the reason that the Court had not cited any
authority for it was that there was none. 28 0 Reflecting in 2009 on the
Court's decision in Gonzales, he lamented that courts would now "have to
decide case-by-case whether an agency is parroting or not." 281 In other
words, Seminole Rock's relatively straightforward analysis of "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" had become more layered
and nuanced.
And this was not the only expansion of the Seminole Rock analysis during
his tenure. In SmithKline Beecham, the Court aptly summarized many of the
exceptions to Seminole Rock; all of which had been incorporated into the
Seminole Rock analysis while Justice Scalia was a member of the Court:
Although [Seminole Rock] ordinarily calls for deference to an agency's interpretation of
its own ambiguous regulation, even when that interpretation is advanced in a legal

brief... this general rule does not apply in all cases. Deference is undoubtedly
inappropriate, for example, when the agency's interpretation is "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." . . . And deference is likewise unwarranted when
there is reason to suspect that the agency's interpretation "does not reflect the
agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question."... This might
occur when the agency's interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation, . . . or
when it appears that the interpretation is nothing more than a "convenient litigating
position," .. . or "post hoc rationalizatio[n] advanced by an agency seeking to defend
past agency action against attack."

28 2

276. Id. at 194 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001)).
277. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 236.
278. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
279. Id. at 277 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("It is doubtful that any such exception to the Auer
rule exists.").
280. Id. at 277 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the "Court cites no authority for it,
because there is none.").
281. See Scalia, 25th Anniversary, supra note 261, at 246.
282. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-67 (2012)
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Thus, taken together, Mead's new rule and these various Seminole Rock
exceptions undermine the ability of both Chevron and Seminole Rock to
operate as "blanket default" rules in our administrative state. 283 Thus,
Justice Scalia's earlier view in 1989 that it was "best to adopt a
straightforward default rule that courts could easily administer and that
Congress, if it wished, could legislate around" no longer applied in full
force. Perhaps the Court's recitation in SmithKline Beecham of what the
Seminole Rock inquiry had become finally tipped Justice Scalia towards his
conclusion that it would be best to abandon it all together.284
Third, Justice Scalia also expressed a broader concern that agencies were
amassing too much power for his comfort. In his view, abandoning Seminole
Rock was a prime way to diminish such power. He explained his belief in
detail in his dissent in Perez that Chevron and Seminole Rock have tilted the
balance that Congress sought when it enacted the APA.285 He believed that
because of the Court's creation of an "elaborate law of deference to
agencies' interpretation of statutes and regulations," an agency effectively
can now "authoritatively resolve ambiguities" in both statutes and
regulations. 286
This development, in his view, undermined the APA's goal to serve as a
"check" to agency "zeal" to counter the unprecedented growth of our
administrative state.28 7 Various provisions within the APA were supposed
to function together to act as a restraint on agency action. For example,
the notice-and-comment provisions set forth a procedural mechanism for

(citing Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 211 (2011); ThomasJefferson Univ.
v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994); and quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62
(1997); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)) (final alteration in original); see also
generally Auer, 519 U.S. at 461-62; Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158,
170-71 (2007) (suggesting Seminole Rock deference was not warranted if interpretation results
in "unfair surprise").
283. See Scalia, 25th Anniversary, supra note 261, at 244.
284. Nor would returning to the pre-exception Seminole Rock standard be satisfying to
Justice Scalia because of his broader concern about the aggrandizement of agency power.
Regardless of whether Justice Scalia might have been partly satisfied if Mead were overruled, some of his same concerns about Seminole Rock would remain, such as the
constitutional prohibition of allowing agencies to self-interpret, as well as incentivizing
agencies to promulgate vague regulations.
285. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212-13 (2015) (Scalia,
concurring).
286. Id. at 1211 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
287. Id. (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950)).
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agencies to follow when promulgating a rule, 288 and another provision
assigns the court the role to then "interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action." 289 Thus, when enacting the APA, Congress envisioned that
courts would have the authoritative role to decide ambiguities in statutes
and regulations. 290
Therefore, an agency should use a legislative rule to make known its
interpretation of the law to the public, but such interpretation does not bind
the public (and should not have the force of law) because the court during
judicial review has the final say on the matter. 29 1 ButJustice Scalia believed
that the Seminole Rock doctrine, as it is currently applied, has upset this
balance.29 2 Simply stated, the courts' role to resolve ambiguities is illusory
when the courts are compelled to defer under Seminole Rock.293 Because
agencies can now effectively bind the public as a result of the agency
receiving deference for its interpretation of its interpretive rule, interpretive
rules are no longer used simply to notify the public. 294
In sum, in light ofJustice Scalia's view that our administrative state has
evolved in this way, it should be no surprise that his view on the merits of
the Seminole Rock doctrine evolved, as well. His newfound solution to
"restore the balance originally struck by the APA with respect to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations" was naturally to jettison
Seminole Rock. 295 To do so would restore the APA's plain language resulting
in no deference to agencies' interpretations of their regulations and would
provide the needed check to agency power that had grown to unacceptable
levels during his time on the Court. 296

288. Id. at 1202; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (mandating that an agency notify the
regulated community of the proposed rule, ask for comments on the rule, consider and reply
to comments received, and then justify the final rule or decision upon completion).
289. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211 (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 706 (2012)).
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1213.

293. Id. at 1212; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
294. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating
"interpretive rules that command deference do have the force of law.").
295. Id. at 1213.
296. Id.; see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating a regulation's meaning should be
determined by applying "familiar tools of textual interpretation," such as the fairest reading
of the regulation).
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CONCLUSION

As I have set forth in previous articles, reforming the current Seminole
Rock standard would lead to positive results in our administrative state, such
as increased consistency, uniformity, fairness and transparency.97 The
various opinions ofJustice Scalia addressing the Seminole Rock doctrine show
that there are both practical implications and weighty constitutional
concerns with the doctrine that impede the achievement of these principles.
These concerns coupled with the confusion and inconsistencies in the lower
courts when they attempt to apply the doctrine demonstrate why the Court
should not allow Justice Scalia's efforts to have been in vain. The Court
should re-evaluate the doctrine to reform Seminole Rock to address the
persuasive practical and constitutional concerns expressed by Justice Scalia
and other justices.

297. Leske, Splits in the Rock, supra note 14 ("more clarity and uniformity in [the Seminole
Rock inquiry] should promote greater fairness, increased transparency, and more meaningful
public participation."); see als* Leske, Hard Place, supra note 2, at 274 (challenging the current
Seminole Rock standard "would better effectuate consistency, transparency, and accountability
in the administrative state").

